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Journal Articles

Jepson School of Leadership Studies
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Trying to excel in the Golden State: anti-immigrant sentiment and immigrant educational achievement in California

Volha Chykina

Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, USA

ABSTRACT

Anti-immigrant hostility continues to rise throughout multicultural societies. Building on segmented assimilation theory, in this manuscript I examine whether anti-immigrant sentiment might decrease school performance of immigrant children using the case of California, the state with the largest population of immigrants in the United States. I find a negative association between an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment at the community level and academic performance of immigrant students. This finding has broad implications for our understanding of immigrant educational experiences. It is also especially relevant at a time when multicultural societies are struggling to incorporate immigrants successfully into their economic, social, and political spheres.

The recent surge in anti-immigrant sentiment across the globe has captured the attention of researchers and policymakers alike (Brown and Koo 2015; Frey 2020; Guma and Dafydd Jones 2019; Rzepnikowska 2019; Young 2017). Immigration became a particularly contested issue in the United States after Donald Trump’s election as president (PRC 2016). In the ensuing four years, many Americans joined Trump in expressing anti-immigrant opinions and even marched in support of his plans to ‘build a wall’ against Mexican immigration and to ban Muslim immigrants from the United States. More recently, Trump’s response, and the response from many of his supporters, to the COVID-19 pandemic was to blame China, the Chinese, and sometimes Asians more generally for America’s public health crisis. This blaming further highlighted anti-immigrant tensions that reside at the heart of contemporary American politics and society. Taken together, these anti-immigrant public messages, alongside proposed and enacted policy changes, left immigrants concerned about their futures in the United States (Asad 2020; Chykina and Crabtree 2018; Rodriguez 2018). Furthermore, these tensions are present not only in the United States, but also in many other multicultural societies across the world (Gattinara 2018; Guma and Dafydd Jones 2019; Lulle, Moroşanu, and King 2018).

While social scientists do not yet have available data to quantitatively examine the effects of this recent rise in anti-immigrant sentiment in immigrant communities on the school achievement of immigrant students at scale, variation in anti-immigrant sentiment is not a new phenomenon (Young 2017). The variation that occurred in the past can be leveraged to examine the effect of anti-immigrant sentiment on the academic achievement of immigrant students. If such effects manifested in the past, it would help shed light on how immigrant students might be affected by the recent rise in anti-immigrant sentiment. In this vein, this paper examines the associations between...
ABSTRACT: In his seminal Orientalism and Religion (1999), Richard King argues that Western scholars of religion have constructed a conceptual dichotomy between “mysticism” and “rationality” that has caused them to systematically distort the claims and arguments of Eastern thinkers. While King focuses primarily on Western scholarship on the Buddhist and Hindu traditions, this essay shows that his argument can also be extended to apply to Western scholarship on al-Ghazālī, whose sympathy for Sufism and apparent rejection of Greek philosophy has often earned him the reputation of being a champion of Islamic mysticism. I argue that al-Ghazālī transcends the dueling categories of ‘rationality’ and ‘mysticism’ that have been imposed on him by offering a conception of experiential knowledge that retains its roots in the ‘mystical’ Sufi tradition, even while also highlighting the rational merits of experientially-grounded modes of knowing. In particular, I argue that al-Ghazālī shows us how experiential knowledge is both important to providing motivation for rational action and also critical to underwriting persons’ genuine understanding of the evaluative properties of that which is known.

Keywords: Al-Ghazālī, cognitive emotions, experiential knowledge, Ibn Sīnā, mysticism, Sufism

In his seminal Orientalism and Religion (1999), Richard King argues that Western scholars of religion have constructed a conceptual dichotomy between “mysticism” and “rationality” that has been used, both within and without the academy, as a tool to manage and marginalize the Orient. According to King, nineteenth and twentieth century academics’ use of the category of the “Mystic East” not only served to homogenize diverse patterns of life and thought in the Orient (79, 98-101), but also—indirectly—to help justify various forms of their subordination to the ‘rational’ West. In portraying Eastern traditions of thought as “mystical”, King argues, Western academics have created grounds for dismissing the insights of these traditions as
The Place of Philosophy in Bioethics Today

Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby, Sean Aas, Dan Brudney, Jessica Flanagan, S. Matthew Liao, Alex London, Wayne Sumner, and Julian Savulescu

ABSTRACT
In some views, philosophy’s glory days in bioethics are over. While philosophers were especially important in the early days of the field, so the argument goes, the majority of the work in bioethics today involves the “simple” application of existing philosophical principles or concepts, as well as empirical work in bioethics. Here, we address this view head on and ask: What is the role of philosophy in bioethics today? This paper has three specific aims: (1) to respond to skeptics and make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics, (2) to discuss some of the current challenges to the meaningful integration of philosophy and bioethics, and (3) to make suggestions for what needs to happen in order for the two fields to stay richly connected. We outline how bioethics center directors, funders, and philosopher bioethicists can help.

WHY BIOETHICS STILL NEEDS PHILOSOPHERS
Philosophers continue to play a fundamental role in bioethical analysis. Resolving normative questions requires principles, concepts, and theories. It requires weighing considered judgments about particular cases against general principles, applying technical concepts from metaphysics and epistemology, and engaging in debates in moral theory and philosophy of science, among other things. These are all domains of expertise of the philosopher. As Sulmasy and Sugarman

During a recent plenary session at a bioethics conference, several leading scholars in bioethics expressed the view that there is nothing philosophically interesting left to be done in bioethics. They argued that the majority of the work in bioethics today involves the simple application of existing philosophical principles or concepts. They contrasted this to the early days of the field where philosophers were especially important in helping to establish guiding principles, develop analytical frameworks, and map out concepts (e.g., the principle of autonomy, the concept of decision making capacity, the concept of equipoise, etc.). In their view, now that these theoretical foundations have been established, clinicians, ethics consultants, policy makers, and scholars need only to be trained in how to apply these foundations to cases. This applied work is relatively straightforward and not particularly intellectually challenging, so the argument went. In essence, philosophy’s glory days in bioethics are over. Many of the members of the audience seemed to agree with these views, judging by how the discussion evolved. In our experience, this sentiment was not simply a single instance expressed at a one-off event, but rather, one we have seen as increasingly expressed in the field.

As philosophers working in the field of bioethics, we aim to directly address and counter this view. This paper has three aims: (1) to respond to skeptics and make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics, (2) to discuss some of the current challenges to the meaningful integration of philosophy and bioethics, and (3) to make suggestions for what needs to happen in order for the two fields to stay richly connected.
Racial Justice Requires Ending the War on Drugs

Brian D. Earp\textsuperscript{a}, Jonathan Lewis\textsuperscript{b}, and Carl L. Hart\textsuperscript{c}, with Bioethicists and Allied Professionals for Drug Policy Reform*  
\textsuperscript{a}Yale University; \textsuperscript{b}Dublin City University; \textsuperscript{c}Columbia University

ABSTRACT

Historically, laws and policies to criminalize drug use or possession were rooted in explicit racism, and they continue to wreak havoc on certain racialized communities. We are a group of bioethicists, drug experts, legal scholars, criminal justice researchers, sociologists, psychologists, and other allied professionals who have come together in support of a policy proposal that is evidence-based and ethically recommended. We call for the immediate decriminalization of all so-called recreational drugs and, ultimately, for their timely and appropriate legal regulation. We also call for criminal convictions for nonviolent offenses pertaining to the use or possession of small quantities of such drugs to be expunged, and for those currently serving time for these offenses to be released. In effect, we call for an end to the “war on drugs.”

KEYWORDS

race and culture/ethnicity; health policy; regulatory issues

A series of prominent killings of unarmed Black people by police in spring 2020 has renewed calls to address systemic racism in the United States and around the world. Among those killed was Breonna Taylor, whose home was wrongfully entered by officers without warning as part of a drug-related search. As we will detail, Black people in the United States are disproportionately targeted, arrested, and incarcerated for crimes related to non-medical drug use, and this is one area where social reform is urgently needed. We are a group of bioethicists, drug experts, legal scholars, criminal justice researchers, sociologists, psychologists, and other allied professionals (see Appendix for details) who have come together in support of a policy proposal that is evidence-based and ethically recommended. We call for the immediate decriminalization of all psychoactive substances currently deemed illicit for personal use or possession, and, ultimately, for their full legalization and careful regulation. In effect, we call for an end to the “war on drugs.”

In principle, the “war on drugs” aims to protect people from harm and promote public health. In practice, it has worsened many aspects of public health while inordinately harming certain racialized communities (Mauer and King 2007). In addition, the “war on drugs” has fostered a condescending moralism that conflates drug use with violence or bad character and casts drug users—especially Black and Hispanic drug users—as criminals-in-waiting who deserve to be punished (Mallea 2014). Indeed, the very language of a “war” can work to reinforce “a set of beliefs and values that stress the use of force and domination as appropriate means to solve problems and gain political power” (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). In contrast to this approach, we argue for ending the drug war and investing in the most heavily affected communities. If managed carefully, this shift in policy will not only improve public health, reduce crime and recidivism, lower unemployment and poverty rates, and save governments large sums of money (which could be better spent; see Box 1); it will strike a necessary blow against racial injustice.

The context here is instructive. Historically, drug laws and enforcement have reflected and perpetuated explicit racism, including early legislation against
SPEECH AND CAMPUS INCLUSIVITY

Jessica Flanigan and Alec Greven

University administrators should not enforce speech codes because speech codes are generally counterproductive to a university’s educational mission. In making the case against campus speech codes, we consider and reply to four of the most prominent arguments in favor of restricting student speech. These arguments appeal to the values of harm prevention, inclusive education, relational equality, and the overall promotion of free speech. We show that speech restrictions do not effectively promote these values. We conclude that campus administrators should uphold protections for freedom of expression on college campuses in order to promote a more egalitarian and inclusive learning environment.

Should private universities uphold broad protections for students’ freedom of expression? At some universities, administrators enforce speech codes and other restrictions on students’ expression. These policies aim to prevent speech that undermines the university’s values, especially speech that is derogatory or insulting toward other members of the campus community. We argue that university administrators should not enforce these speech codes because speech codes are generally counterproductive to a university’s educational mission. In making the case against campus speech codes, we consider four of the most prominent arguments in favor of restricting student speech:

(1) **Harm Prevention**: University officials should not tolerate conduct that is harmful to students on campus. Some kinds of speech harm students on campus. So university officials should enforce speech codes that protect students from harm.

(2) **Inclusive Education**: University officials should create a campus environment that gives all students equal opportunities to learn. Unrestricted campus speech inhibits some students’ learning and potentially widens achievement gaps. Therefore, university officials should enforce speech codes that protect students’ ability to learn.
Moral relativists resist health mandates during the COVID-19 pandemic

Donelson R. Forsyth
University of Richmond, United States of America

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Keywords: Ethics position theory Moral psychology Public health COVID-19

ABSTRACT

In a study of US residents during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, their moral judgments of noncompliance with health mandates predicted their failure to comply with these health-promoting guidelines ($r = +0.87, n = 303$). Moreover, and consistent with ethics position theory (Forsyth, 2020), moral relativism predicted both moral judgments of noncompliance and noncompliance itself, and these relationships remained significant when controlling for other factors, such as political orientation and race. Moral beliefs that emphasized minimizing harm to others (idealism), in contrast, were not associated with compliance. These findings are both empirically noteworthy and practically significant: (a) they affirm the close connections among moral personality, moral judgment, and individuals’ actions in morally turbulent situations and (b) suggest moral framings will strengthen the effectiveness of health promotion campaigns.

1. Introduction

During the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 health authorities urged people to reduce the spread of the disease through nonpharmaceutical interventions, including disinfecting surfaces, quarantining, and social distancing. Many people complied, but a substantial number refused. Some apparently thought the disease would not cause them harm (e.g., Harper et al., 2020). Others were more influenced by the opinions of their friends and associates rather than medical professionals (Dryhurst et al., 2020). Some aligned their actions with those of their political leaders (e.g., Pedersen & Favero, 2020).

But some people considered compliance to be a moral issue. As Roy Cooper (2020), governor of North Carolina, tweeted, “A face covering signifies strength and compassion for others. Wearing one shows you actually care about other people’s health.” Others, in contrast, considered these restrictions to be a moral affront; an unwarranted restriction of the basic right of self-determination. As one respondent to Governor Cooper’s tweet expressed it, “This is about the #Constitution and our Civil Liberties, the Right to assemble to Worship or Protest. The Right to feed my family or to bury a loved one” (occupycorruptDC, 2020).

The current research examined the relationship between people’s compliance with medical mandates and their moral judgments. Previous research suggests that, in some situations, individuals who judge a behavior to be morally good are more likely to enact that behavior. Adolescents who consider helping others to be morally good were more likely to act in helpful ways (Patrick et al., 2018). Those who morally champion civil disobedience were also the ones who took part in a sit-in protesting the curtailment of free speech (Candee & Kohlberg, 1987). Athletes who disagreed with such statements as “It is OK to cheat if nobody knows” were less likely to cheat in actual match play (Lucidi et al., 2017). These findings suggest that individuals who believe that compliance with health mandates is morally good should themselves be more likely to comply with those mandates.

But what factors determine individuals’ moral appraisals of health mandates? The current investigation draws on ethics position theory (Forsyth, 1980, 2020) to answer this question. This theory traces differences in moral judgments to differences in people’s concern for others’ well-being (idealism) and compliance with moral standards (relativism). Those who are more idealistic are attentive to the welfare of others, whereas those who are more relativistic are skeptical about universal moral standards. These two dimensions parallel the philosophical distinctions between moral theories based on the consequences of actions (consequentialism) and those based on principles and duty (deontology).

Applied to noncompliance with health mandates, ethics position theory suggests that idealism will limit noncompliance, but that relativism will elevate it. Idealism is associated with concern for others and more negative evaluations of actions that may cause harm. When, for example, individuals respond to moral dilemmas, idealism predicts more positive evaluations of prosocial choices (e.g., McNair et al., 2019). Relativism, however, is associated with a skepticism of, and often noncompliance with, standards that define the difference between right
Recent Advances in the Study of Group Cohesion

Donelson R. Forsyth
Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond

Objective: Group cohesion, as a central explanatory concept in the study of groups, has provided a foundation for explaining a number of group processes that have occupied researchers’ attention since the founding of the journal Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice 25 years ago. Method: This review summarizes that research, focusing on three specific topics: group performance, the effectiveness of group psychotherapy, and group-based identity processes. Results: Theory and research in these areas have yielded substantial insights into cohesion and related group processes, but definitional, methodological, and theoretical uncertainties remain to be resolved. Conclusions: Seeking to resolve some of these uncertainties, an integrative model of cohesion that defines cohesion as a group’s degree of unity—and distinguishes between the causes (or antecedents) of that unity (such as attraction bonds or group pride) and indicators of cohesion—is described, as is a short inventory that can be used to assess members’ perceptions of the unity of their groups.

Highlights and Implications
• The concept of cohesion is central to understanding groups and group processes, and recent research has yielded substantial advances in understanding the nature, the sources, and the consequences of this key group-level process.
• Specifically, recent research provides a clearer understanding of when cohesion facilitates team performance, cohesion’s influence on the outcome of group psychotherapy, and the relationship between cohesion and members’ social identities.
• To resolve continuing issues of definition and assessment, an integrative conceptualization of cohesion, unitary cohesion theory, is described; it defines cohesion as the unity of a group, and so distinguishes between the causes of cohesion, indicators of cohesion, and cohesion itself.
• Recommendations for future research include identifying and documenting the type of cohesion assessed in specific instruments and using methods that are appropriate when studying a group-level process.
• A unitary cohesion index is described. This set of bipolar rating scales can be used to directly assess members’ estimates of their group’s cohesion by separating the defining conditions of cohesion from the potential causes of cohesion.

Keywords: group cohesion, team performance, group psychotherapy, social identity, unitary cohesion index

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Individual differences in ethics positions: The EPQ-5

Ernest H. O’Boyle, Donelson R. Forsyth

1 Department of Management & Entrepreneurship, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, United States of America, 2 Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, United States of America

* oboyleeh@gmail.com

Abstract

We revised the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ), which measures variations in sensitivity to harm (idealism) and to moral standards (relativism). Study 1 identified the core components of the measured constructs theoretically and verified those features through confirmatory factor analysis (n = 2,778). Study 2 replicated these findings (n = 10,707), contrasted the theoretically defined two-factor model to alternative models, and tested for invariance of factor covariances and mean structures for men and women. Study 3 examined the relationship between the EPQ and related indicators of ethical thought (values and moral foundations) and the theory’s four-fold classification typology of exceptionists, subjectivists, absolutists, and situationists. The three studies substantially reduced the original EPQ’s length, clarified the conceptual interpretation of the idealism and relativism scales, affirmed the EPQ’s predictive and convergent validity, and supported the four-fold classification of individuals into ethics positions. Implications for previous findings and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Introduction

People, no matter what their personal backgrounds or cultural heritage, tend to agree when judging demonstrably benevolent or particularly egregious actions, but this consensus is lost when the discussion turns to less clear-cut issues. Do women have the right to abort their pregnancies? Should society end the life of convicted murderers? Should you press the switch to divert the trolley away from four workers, knowing that your choice will cause one person to die? Is it morally right to eat your pet dog after you accidentally run it over [1]?

Researchers have traced these variations to a number of stable individual differences, including personality traits, political ideology, cognitive development, and values [2]. The current research, drawing on ethics position theory (EPT), examines two of these sources: differences in idealism and relativism [3,4]. Morality generally involves acting in ways that minimize injuring others, but those who are less idealistic believe that harm is sometimes unavoidable. Moreover, many people rely on principles to inform their moral choices, but more relativistic individuals are skeptical about the possibility of formulating universal moral standards. The Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) measures these two dimensions of individuals’ moral philosophies.
The 2020 election and its aftermath: Love, lies, and ensorceling leadership

George R Goethals
University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, USA

Abstract
Though Donald Trump decisively lost the 2020 US presidential election, his mob-inciting charisma created a large and devoted base unusual in American politics. Insights from Sigmund Freud’s account of the emotional connections between leaders and followers, and later reframing of those views, suggest some of the dynamics that create the intense attachment expressed by Trump supporters, and his resulting ability to get his most loyal followers and allies to believe and do almost anything, no matter the evidence揭示ing his lies and the extremity of his demands. Essential elements include qualities of a leader and the leader’s message that make followers unable to countenance any criticism of their loved, overvalued messenger; followers’ uncritical willingness to believe whatever the leader says; and followers’ capacity to rationalize whatever actions they take as a result of those claims. The troubling implications for democracy of both the Electoral College and the Republican Party’s embrace of Trump and his message are discussed.

Keywords
Donald Trump, 2020 election, crowd psychology, leader idealization, rationalization, Republican Party, democracy

The 3rd November 2020 US presidential election and its 2-month aftermath revealed aspects of both resilience and vulnerability in America’s republican democracy. We may never know how close Donald Trump came to overturning the clear will of the people, essentially staging a coup, by enlisting the support of Republican officials at various levels throughout the federal system and across state governments. They were shameless in being complicit in fomenting a dangerous riot of Trump supporters at the US Capitol. On the other hand, throughout the post-election period even more local and state officials in several swing states resisted the pressure of Trump and his allies, working diligently to ensure a fair outcome. It was not obvious that their resistance would hold. The
The Richest Black Girl in America

When an 11-year-old Black girl in Jim Crow America discovers a seemingly worthless plot of land she has inherited is worth millions, everything in her life changes — and the walls begin to close in. The untold story brought to life from thousands of pages of archival documents.

Sarah Rector, 11, stood up and wiped her hands on her sweat-soaked shift, a simple loose dress. She had to squint to block out the radiating sun. It was another hot August in rural Oklahoma — hot enough for her barefoot soles to grow numb from the scorching dirt. She wasn’t much taller than the cotton plants surrounding her.
An Abhidharmic theory of welfare

Javier Hidalgo

Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, USA

ABSTRACT

Do Buddhist philosophical commitments support a particular theory of well-being? Most authors who have examined this question argue that Buddhist ideas are compatible with multiple theories of well-being. In this paper, I contend that one tradition of Buddhist philosophy—Abhidharma—does imply a specific theory of welfare. In particular, Abhidharma supports hedonism. Most Abhidharmikas claim that only property-particulars called dhammas ultimately exist and I argue that an Abhidharmic theory of well-being should only refer to these properties. Yet the only dhammas that could plausibly be intrinsically good are phenomenal properties that are good in virtue of how they feel. Thus, the only intrinsically good things are pleasures. I defend this surprising conclusion from various interpretative objections and show that my argument can also inform contemporary philosophical debates about welfare.

KEYWORDS

Buddhism; Abhidharma; well-being; hedonism

1. Introduction

Lives can go better or worse. Some lives are good. Others are disasters. What distinguishes these lives from each other? A theory of well-being helps answer this question. In particular, a theory of well-being tells us what sorts of things are intrinsically good for us. But which things are intrinsically good for us? Some philosophers endorse hedonism, the view that the only intrinsic good is pleasure. Others argue that the satisfaction of your desires is what benefits you. Still others defend an objective list theory of welfare. According to objective list theories, certain states like virtue or awareness of beauty are good for people irrespective of whether people desire these goods. There are more theories of welfare as well.

Here is my question in this paper: which theory of welfare should Buddhists endorse? Few philosophers have explored this question. But those who have conclude that Buddhism is indeterminate between theories of welfare. In an insightful article, Stephen Harris (2014) argues that most contemporary theories of welfare are, in broad strokes, consistent with Buddhist commitments. Harris concludes: ‘Buddhist texts underdetermine which [theory of welfare] would have been accepted by ancient Indian Buddhists’ (p. 2). Christopher Gowans (2016) claims: ‘Buddhist thought has much to say about well-being, but little that could be considered a philosophy of well-being’ (pp. 78–9). Gowans suggests that Buddhist thought is practical in orientation. As a result, Buddhist
Buddhist Error Theory

Javier Hidalgo

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1 Introduction

Pretty much everyone agrees that reasons exist. We think that we have reasons for action, belief, or attitudes. For example, I have reason to care for my children, to take antibiotics to stave off a dangerous infection, to feel afraid if a tiger is chasing me, and so on. These reasons are normative. Normative reasons explain why we ought to perform certain actions or adopt certain beliefs and attitudes.

Here’s a question that’s seldom asked: how do normative reasons fit into Buddhist philosophy? While there’s been a growing interest in Buddhist metaethics in recent years, the discussion remains preliminary.1 Few philosophers have systematically examined what Buddhist commitments imply for metaethics. But some authors suspect that Buddhism is unable to make sense of normative reasons. Throughout its long history, Buddhism’s critics have alleged that Buddhist principles entail nihilism. In recent years, Dan Arnold has developed a sophisticated version of this argument.2 Buddhist epistemologists such as Dharmakīrti hold that only causally efficacious entities are real. Yet Arnold claims that reasons don’t have causal powers. So, Buddhist philosophers are committed to the view that reasons are unreal. But, if Buddhist philosophy lacks the resources to make sense of a “logical space for reasons,” then Buddhism faces problem of incoherence and self-defeat. If there are no reasons, then there are no reasons to believe Buddhism. Furthermore, Arnold suggests that it’s impossible to rationally believe that there are no reasons. So, we


Javier Hidalgo
hidalgoj@gmail.com

1 Jepson School of Leadership Studies, 221 Richmond Way, Richmond, VA 23173-0007, USA
EMPTY OR EMERGENT PERSONS?
A CRITIQUE OF BUDDHIST PERSONALISM

JAVIER HIDALGO

ABSTRACT: In contrast to Buddhist Reductionists who deny the ultimate existence of the persons, Buddhist Personalists claim that persons are ultimately real in some important sense. Recently, some philosophers have offered philosophical reconstructions of Buddhist Personalism. In this paper, I critically evaluate one philosophical reconstruction of Buddhist Personalism according to which persons are irreducible to the parts that constitute them. Instead, persons are emergent entities and have novel properties that are distinct from the properties of their constituents. While this emergentist interpretation is an interesting and well-motivated reconstruction of the Personalist position, I ultimately reject it on substantive grounds. I distinguish between different kinds of emergentism in the contemporary philosophical literature and show that they fail to support Buddhist Personalism. I thus conclude that Buddhist Personalism is untenable if it’s committed to emergentism about persons. This paper also indirectly defends Buddhist Reductionism by showing that it has crucial advantages over Buddhist Personalism.

Keywords: Buddhism, Buddhist philosophy, emergentism, philosophy of mind, reductionism

1. INTRODUCTION

Many Buddhist philosophers argue that persons and selves are unreal. On their view, persons are aggregations of psychophysical elements, such as material form, sensation, and mental formations. Yet aggregates are fictions. While we impute persons and other wholes onto phenomena, they don’t really exist. Some fictions are useful though. Certain fictions help us to achieve our aims and their acceptance can promote good outcomes. Persons are one such fiction. If we accept that persons are real, then suffering may be reduced. If so, then we can say that persons are conventionally real, although it’s false that persons exist from the ultimate perspective that describes what the world is really like. Let’s call this set of views: Buddhist Reductionism.

Classical Buddhist philosophers, such as Vasubandhu, seem to have endorsed
Believing in the American Dream Sustains Negative Attitudes toward Those in Poverty

Crystal L. Hoyt1, Jeni L. Burnette2, Rachel B. Forsyth3, Mitchell Parry4, and Brenten H. DeShields5

Abstract
A critical lever in the fight against poverty is to improve attitudes toward those living in poverty. Attempting to understand the factors that impact these attitudes, we ask: Does believing that meritocracy exists (descriptive meritocracy) sustain negative attitudes? Using cross-sectional (N = 301) and experimental (N = 439) methods, we found that belief in the United States as a meritocracy is associated with blaming people living in poverty and predicts negative attitudes toward them. Replicating and extending these findings, we experimentally manipulated beliefs in meritocracy and blame. Weakening American Dream beliefs predicted improved attitudes toward those in poverty. Understanding the nuanced role of belief systems in attitudes toward those in poverty provides strategies for promoting more positive thoughts and feelings.

Keywords
American Dream, blame, meritocracy, negative attitudes, poverty, prejudice

The stark wealth disparity in the United States of America is jarring; it is one of the world’s wealthiest countries, yet millions live in poverty. A recent United Nations Human Rights investigation labeled the United States “the most unequal developed nation,” with more than 40 million people living in poverty and over half of them living in extreme or absolute poverty (Alston 2018). This unprecedented economic inequality is maintained and intensified by factors in a variety of domains of social life (Piketty, Saez, and Zucman 2017). It results, in part, from negative attitudes toward those in poverty and associated economic policies—from taxes to health care—that advantage those from wealthy backgrounds over those from impoverished backgrounds. The stark wealth disparity in the United States of America is jarring; it is one of the world’s wealthiest countries, yet millions live in poverty. A recent United Nations Human Rights investigation labeled the United States “the most unequal developed nation,” with more than 40 million people living in poverty and over half of them living in extreme or absolute poverty (Alston 2018). This unprecedented economic inequality is maintained and intensified by factors in a variety of domains of social life (Piketty, Saez, and Zucman 2017). It results, in part, from negative attitudes toward those in poverty and associated economic policies—from taxes to health care—that advantage those from wealthy backgrounds over those from impoverished backgrounds. The stark wealth disparity in the United States of America is jarring; it is one of the world’s wealthiest countries, yet millions live in poverty. A recent United Nations Human Rights investigation labeled the United States “the most unequal developed nation,” with more than 40 million people living in poverty and over half of them living in extreme or absolute poverty (Alston 2018). This unprecedented economic inequality is maintained and intensified by factors in a variety of domains of social life (Piketty, Saez, and Zucman 2017). It results, in part, from negative attitudes toward those in poverty and associated economic policies—from taxes to health care—that advantage those from wealthy backgrounds over those from impoverished backgrounds.

1University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, USA
2North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
3University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
4Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, USA
5University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA

Corresponding Author:
Crystal L. Hoyt, Jepson Hall, University of Richmond, 221 Richmond Way, Richmond, VA 23173, USA.
Email: choyt@richmond.edu
Growth mindsets of anxiety: Do the benefits to individual flourishing come with societal costs?

Crystal L. Hoyt, Jeni L. Burnette, Emma Nash, Whitney Becker and Joseph Billingsley

*Jepson School of Leadership Studies and Department of Psychology, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, USA; †Department of Psychology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA; ‡Department of Management, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA

ABSTRACT
Believing anxiety can change is a predictor of wellbeing, in part, because such beliefs – known as growth mindsets – predict weaker threat appraisals, which in turn improves psychological functioning. However, feeling a sense of personal threat facilitates social activism, and thus growth mindsets may undermine such action. Across six studies (N = 1761), including cross-sectional and experimental approaches (3 pre-registered), growth mindsets predict flourishing, including wellbeing, resilience, and grit. We find that growth mindsets indirectly predict reduced activism against social threats through reduced threat appraisals, which are critical motivators of activism. The total effect linking growth mindsets to activism was not robust. Overall, Bayesian meta-analytic summary effects reveal that growth mindsets of anxiety are critical components of psychological flourishing, broadly defined. Mindsets are also consistently linked to weakened threat appraisals across a variety of social threats from gun violence to natural disasters. Although helpful for resilience, these dampened threat appraisals impair social action.

Believing that anxiety is manageable, also known as holding a growth mindset, can help individuals cope more effectively with adversity (Burnette et al., 2020). This link is driven, in part, because growth mindsets inform threat appraisals, defined as beliefs that one can handle the stressor, that stress can be adaptive, and that arousal can be a learning tool (Crum et al., 2017; Seo et al., 2021). Yet, this very cognitive reframing that helps to protect individuals with growth mindsets from psychological distress might undermine motivation to act against social threats. Although anxiety growth mindsets offer wellbeing benefits to the self, they might also come with social costs. In order to fully harness the potential benefits of growth mindsets of anxiety, we must understand their psychological benefits as well as investigate potential limitations. The primary goal of the current work is twofold: to explore more fully the link between anxiety mindsets and individual flourishing, and to test the idea that growth mindsets might be associated with social costs in the form of decreased social activism via weakened threat appraisals.

Mindset Theory
People’s intuitive beliefs regarding the malleability of personal attributes, from intelligence to weight, impact how they construe their social world. These mindsets range from believing traits are malleable (i.e., growth mindset) to believing they are unchanging (i.e., fixed mindset; Dweck, 1986). Although the majority of early work focused on mindsets of intelligence and academic achievement, mindset theory is now used to understand a range of traits, abilities, and outcomes (Zedelius et al., 2017). Mindsets are particularly important for guiding responses to challenging situations, with growth mindsets promoting beneficial self-regulatory strategies that increase chances of success (Burnette et al., 2013).

Growth mindsets also help individuals cope with mental health challenges. For example, growth, relative to fixed, mindsets of emotions promote more adaptive emotion regulation strategies, with important implications for socioemotional functioning and mental health (e.g., Tamir et al., 2007). Two meta-analyses report moderately strong links between growth mindsets and reduced psychological distress (Burnette et al., 2020; Schleider et al., 2015). There is also a robust link between mindsets of anxiety and greater overall wellbeing (Schröder et al., 2019, 2015, 2017). Furthermore, growth mindsets of people buffer against adverse psychological responses to stressful life events, in part, via weaker threat appraisals (Seo et al., 2021).
ECONOMISTS ON PRIVATE INCENTIVES, ECONOMIC MODELS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE CLASH BETWEEN HAPPINESS AND THE SO-CALLED PUBLIC GOOD

By Sandra J. Peart*

Abstract: This essay examines the administrative state as a ubiquitous phenomenon that results in part from the mismatch of incentives. Using two dramatic episodes in the history of economics, the essay considers two types of mismatch. It then examines how economists increasingly endorsed the “general good” as a unitary goal for society, even at the expense of private hopes and desires. More than this, their procedures and models gave them warrant to design mechanisms and advocate for legislation and regulations to “fix” the supposedly suboptimal choices of individuals in service to the overarching goal. The rise of New Welfare Economics dealt an additional blow to the sovereignty of individual motivations, notwithstanding that Hayek and Buchanan warned that this engineering approach allowed social goals to override individual preferences. Throughout, the argument is that it is important to recognize that people within or advising the administrative state are influenced by the same sorts of (private) motivations as actors throughout the economy.

KEY WORDS: James Buchanan, eugenics, goals, J. S. Mill, New Welfare Economics, private incentives, public good, Lionel Robbins, Soviet growth, Virginia School

1. INTRODUCTION

This essay examines the administrative state as a ubiquitous phenomenon that results in part from the mismatch of incentives. Using two dramatic episodes in the history of economics, the essay considers two types of mismatch. In the first instance, private incentives and goals of the governed were overridden in service to a supposed overarching public goal, the “welfare” of society, writ large. The case study that perhaps best illustrates this mismatch is eugenics, when the search for the “betterment” of the human race overwhelmed the private goals of individuals. Economists were not the only public intellectuals who entered into debates about eugenic policy, but their views on social welfare, as opposed to the happiness of individuals, offered a significant intellectual underpinning for eugenic policies. Second, in their evaluations of Soviet growth rates, many economists presented an institution-free analysis in which they assumed that the private incentives of those who implement policy fully aligned with the stated public goal of economic growth. It later became clear that, in fact, those who implemented the goal of economic growth were also motivated to achieve their private goals of economic betterment.

* Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, speart@richmond.edu.

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On Making and Remaking Ourselves and Others: Mill to Jevons and Beyond on Rationality, Learning, and Paternalism

Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, 221 Richmond Way, Richmond, VA 23173, USA; speart@richmond.edu

ABSTRACT

The approach to human behavior and choice by Mario Rizzo and Glen Whitman in *Escaping Paternalism: Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and Public Policy*, has much in common with that of John Stuart Mill and Philip Wicksteed and departs from the “standard” neoclassical account developed by William Stanley Jevons. I connect the Rizzo-Whitman case for limited paternalism to Mill’s methodological approach and the no harm principle. Mill’s methodology and his emphasis on how people learn via making choices, are consistent with the Rizzo-Whitman approach. Mill’s no harm principle further bolsters their case. In marked contrast with Mill, and like the prescriptive paternalists with whom RW take issue (p. 280), Jevons was confident that he knew how his subjects should act; if they failed to fulfill his conditions for equilibrium spending, he was ready and willing to recommend policies to correct the so-called improvidence and immorality of the laboring classes.

Keywords: John Stuart Mill, William Stanley Jevons, Philip Wicksteed, rationality, no harm principle

JEL Codes: B12, B13

*I am grateful to the editors for the invitation to write this essay, to Rizzo and Whitman for writing such a stimulating book, and to the anonymous referee for extremely helpful suggestions and comments.*
Opportunities for Interaction

Natural Observations of Children’s Social Behavior in Five Societies

Tanya Broesch, et al. [full author details at the end of the article]

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Abstract
We examine the opportunities children have for interacting with others and the extent to which they are the focus of others’ visual attention in five societies where extended family communities are the norm. We compiled six video-recorded datasets (two from one society) collected by a team of anthropologists and psychologists conducting long-term research in each society. The six datasets include video observations of children among the Yasawas (Fiji), Tanna (Vanuatu), Tsimane (Bolivia), Huatasani (Peru), and Aka (infants and children 4–12 years old; Central African Republic). Each dataset consists of a series of videos of children ranging in age from 2 months to 12 years in their everyday contexts. We coded 998 videos and identified with whom children had opportunities to interact (male and female adults and children) as well as the number of individuals and the proportion of observed time that children spent with these individuals. We also examined the proportion of time children received direct visual gaze (indicating attention to the child). Our results indicate that children less than 5 years old spend the majority of their observed time in the presence of one female adult. This is the case across the five societies. In the three societies from which we have older children (Aka, Yasawa, Peru), we find a clear shift around 5 years of age, with children spending the majority of their time with other children. We also coded the presence or absence of a primary caregiver and found that caregivers remained within 2 ft of target children until 7 years of age. When they were in the company of a primary caregiver, children older than seven spent the majority of their time more than 2 ft from the caregiver. We found a consistent trend across societies with decreasing focal attention on the child with increasing child age. These findings show (1) remarkable consistency across these societies in children’s interaction opportunities and (2) that a developmental approach is needed to fully understand human development because the social context is dynamic across the lifespan. These data can serve as a springboard for future research examining social development in everyday contexts.

Keywords Childhood · Culture · Natural observations · Hunter-gatherers · Caregiving · Social development · Attachment · Infancy
Do wealth and inequality associate with health in a small-scale subsistence society?

Adrian V Jaeggi1,2*, Aaron D Blackwell3*, Christopher von Rueden4, Benjamin C Trumble5,6, Jonathan Stieglitz7, Angela R Garcia2,5,6, Thomas S Kraft8, Bret A Beheim9, Paul L Hooper10,11, Hillard Kaplan10, Michael Gurven8

1Institute of Evolutionary Medicine, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland; 2Department of Anthropology, Emory University, Atlanta, United States; 3Department of Anthropology, Washington State University, Pulman, United States; 4Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, United States; 5School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, United States; 6Center for Evolution and Medicine, School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, United States; 7Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse, France; 8Department of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, United States; 9Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany; 10Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Irvine, United States; 11Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, United States

Abstract In high-income countries, one’s relative socio-economic position and economic inequality may affect health and well-being, arguably via psychosocial stress. We tested this in a small-scale subsistence society, the Tsimane, by associating relative household wealth (n = 871) and community-level wealth inequality (n = 40, Gini = 0.15–0.53) with a range of psychological variables, stressors, and health outcomes (depressive symptoms [n = 670], social conflicts [n = 401], non-social problems [n = 398], social support [n = 399], cortisol [n = 811], body mass index [n = 9,926], blood pressure [n = 3,195], self-rated health [n = 2523], morbidities [n = 1542]) controlling for community-average wealth, age, sex, household size, community size, and distance to markets. Wealthier people largely had better outcomes while inequality associated with more respiratory disease, a leading cause of mortality. Greater inequality and lower wealth were associated with higher blood pressure. Psychosocial factors did not mediate wealth-health associations. Thus, relative socio-economic position and inequality may affect health across diverse societies, though this is likely exacerbated in high-income countries.

Introduction It is relatively uncontroversial that people with greater access to resources – usually operationalized as income, wealth, or broader indicators of socio-economic position, rank, or status (used interchangeably here) – are likely to be in better health as resources can be converted into better nutritional status, access to health care, or insulation against health risks. Such benefits of absolute rank are also commonly found in nonhuman primates (Cowlishaw and Dunbar, 1991; Pusey et al., 1997; Snyder-Mackler et al., 2020; van Noordwijk and van Schaik, 1999). However, there is increasing evidence that relative access to resources, that is, one’s relative position in a socio-economic hierarchy, may also affect health. Across developed societies, there is causal evidence for a health gradient along
Gender Differences in Social Networks Based on Prevailing Kinship Norms in the Mosuo of China

Siobhán M. Mattison 1,2,*, Neil G. MacLaren 3, Ruizhe Liu 1, Adam Z. Reynolds 1, Gabrielle D. Baca 1, Peter M. Mattison 4, Meng Zhang 5, Chun-Yi Sum 6, Mary K. Shenk 7, Tami Blumenfield 1,8,9 and Katherine Wander 10

Abstract: Although cooperative social networks are considered key to human evolution, emphasis has usually been placed on the functions of men’s cooperative networks. What do women’s networks look like? Do they differ from men’s networks and what does this suggest about evolutionarily inherited gender differences in reproductive and social strategies? In this paper, we test the ‘universal gender differences’ hypothesis positing gender-specific network structures against the ‘gender reversal’ hypothesis that posits that women’s networks look more ‘masculine’ under matriliny. Specifically, we ask whether men’s friendship networks are always larger than women’s networks in Mosuo communities. In tentative support of the gender reversal hypothesis, we find that women’s networks look more ‘masculine’ under matriliny. In summary, we propose that men and women are equally social, but their sociality is directed differently. To caricature, female sociality is dyadic, whereas male sociality is tribal. In other words, men seek social connection in a broad group with multiple people, particularly by competing for a good position in a status hierarchy; women, in contrast, seek social connection in close personal relationships based on mutual, dyadic intimacy. (Baumeister and Sommer 1997, p. 39)
Where they sing solo: Accounting for cross-cultural variation in collective music-making in theories of music evolution

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Aniruddh D. Patel
Chris von Rueden

Aniruddh D. Patel
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02445, USA
a.patel@tufts.edu; https://ase.tufts.edu/psychology/people/patel/ Program in Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Toronto, ON MG5 1M1, Canada

Chris von Rueden
Affiliation:
Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA 23173, USA cvonrued@richmond.edu; https://sites.google.com/site/chrisvonrueden/home

Abstract

Collective, synchronous music-making is far from ubiquitous across traditional, small-scale societies. We describe societies that lack collective music and offer hypotheses to help explain this cultural variation. Without identifying the factors that explain variation in collective music-making across these societies, theories of music evolution based on social bonding (Savage et al.) or coalition signaling (Mehr et al.) remain incomplete.

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Savage et al. and Mehr, Krasnow, Bryant, & Hagen argue that collective music-making (e.g., group singing and dancing) is part of our evolved human nature because of its adaptive function
Coalitions and conflict: A longitudinal analysis of men’s politics

Daniel Redhead1* and Christopher R. von Rueden2

1Department of Human Behaviour, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 5, 04103 Leipzig, Germany and 2Jepson School of Leadership, University of Richmond, 221 Richmond Way, Richmond, VA 23173, USA
*Corresponding author. E-mail: daniel_redhead@eva.mpg.de

Abstract
To negotiate conflict and navigate status hierarchy, individuals in many species form coalitions. We describe inter-personal conflicts and assess theories of coalition formation in a small-scale human society. Based on longitudinal and cross-sectional social network analysis of men in two communities of Tsimane forager–horticulturalists, we find evidence of reciprocity in coalitional support, as well as evidence of transitivity: an ally of my ally is likely to become my ally. We find mixed support for coalition formation between individuals who share a common adversary. Coalition formation was also predicted by food- and labour-sharing and especially by kinship. Physically formidable men and men higher in informal status were more likely to provide coalitional support over time; evidence was mixed that they receive more coalitional support. The highest status men are hubs of a dense coalitional support network that indirectly link all men in the community. These findings suggest that male coalition formation is multiply motivated, and in general reveals the political dynamics that structure men’s lives in small, relatively egalitarian communities.

Keywords: Coalition formation; social status; conflict; hierarchy; egalitarianism

Social media summary: Among the Tsimane, the emergence of coalitions over time is primarily motivated by social status and existing social relationships between individuals.

Introduction
The politics of animal societies often involves coalition-based competition. This is true of ravens, social carnivores, dolphins, elephants and many primates (Bissonnette et al., 2015). Coalitions can be defined as two or more individuals who cooperate against a third party, be it an individual or rival coalition (Harcourt et al., 1992). The formation and coordination of coalitions are computationally demanding, which may have limited the frequency of their evolution in group-living animals. For example, coalition formation can require tracking changes in within-group loyalties as well as changes in individuals’ relative competitiveness (Silk, 1999; Perry et al., 2004; Young et al., 2014; Pietraszewski, 2016).

Principal motivations for coalition formation are to gain or maintain one’s status rank relative to others or to exacerbate or attenuate status inequality even if relative ranks remain unchanged. In chimpanzees, male participation in coalitions with higher ranking males associates with increased mating opportunity relative to individuals of a similar rank, as well as gains in rank over time (Duffy et al., 2007; Gilby et al., 2013; Watts, 2018). Across many primate species, subordinates also form ‘levelling’ coalitions to weaken higher ranking individuals’ privileged access to resources or mates (Pandit & van...
An Evolutionary Explanation for the Female Leadership Paradox

Jennifer E. Smith1*, Christopher R. von Rueden2*, Mark van Vugt3,4, Claudia Fichtel5 and Peter M. Kappeler5,6

1 Mills College, Oakland, CA, United States, 2 Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, United States, 3 Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 4 Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom, 5 Behavioral Ecology & Sociobiology Unit, German Primate Center, Leibniz Institute for Primate Research, Göttingen, Germany, 6 Department Anthropology/Sociobiology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany

Social influence is distributed unequally between males and females in many mammalian societies. In human societies, gender inequality is particularly evident in access to leadership positions. Understanding why women historically and cross-culturally have tended to be under-represented as leaders within human groups and organizations represents a paradox because we lack evidence that women leaders consistently perform worse than men. We also know that women exercise overt influence in collective group-decisions within small-scale human societies, and that female leadership is pervasive in particular contexts across non-human mammalian societies. Here, we offer a transdisciplinary perspective on this female leadership paradox. Synthesis of social science and biological literatures suggests that females and males, on average, differ in why and how they compete for access to political leadership in mixed-gender groups. These differences are influenced by sexual selection and are moderated by socioecological variation across development and, particularly in human societies, by culturally transmitted norms and institutions. The interplay of these forces contributes to the emergence of female leaders within and across species. Furthermore, females may regularly exercise influence on group decisions in less conspicuous ways and different domains than males, and these underappreciated forms of leadership require more study. We offer a comprehensive framework for studying inequality between females and males in access to leadership positions, and we discuss the implications of this approach for understanding the female leadership paradox and for redressing gender inequality in leadership in humans.

Keywords: leadership, gender, hierarchy, evolution, ecology, mammals, cooperation, collective decision-making

INTRODUCTION

Across all contemporary industrialized societies, women remain underrepresented in boardrooms and governments, holding fewer than 6% of CEO positions at S&P 500 companies (Thomas, 2018) and fewer than 5% of national political leadership positions in the world. While this gender gap has been narrowing (Geiger and Kent, 2017; Bartleby, 2019), the challenges women face in climbing the corporate and political ladder remain substantial (Ryan and Haslam, 2005; Marshall et al., 2017; Kirsch, 2018). A male bias in top positions of leadership is a near cross-cultural universal: in a